This paper studies the competition between Web 2.0 communities in a game theoretic framework.
Introduction
"Web 2.0 communities", such as social networks (e.g., Facebook, Orkut), video sharing sites (e.g., YouTube), virtual world platforms (e.g., Second Life), on-line dating communities (e.g., eHarmony, Match.com) represent a diverse and rapidly growing industry. In this industry, typically, multiple sites compete in a relatively well-defined category (e.g., on-line dating). While these categories are quite different, Web 2.0 community sites share a number of important features: First, most community sites rely extensively on user-generated content where consumers largely define the firms' product offerings. Typically, users have heterogeneous content preferences and favor content generated by similar users, leading to large but local network externalities. In addition, it is easy for consumers to join multiple communities (multi-homing), and sites compete for share of consumer time. While the overall business impact of Web 2.0 communities has been well documented, the competitive implications of these novel economic properties have not been formally addressed. The goal of this study is to close this gap. We study the competition between Web 2.0 communities defined by the above features in a game theoretic framework.
Although the industry is still young, a few stylized facts seem to emerge. First, as a consequence of user-generated content, the content positioning of competing firms can sometimes be determined by their users. Firms may acquire largely unintended and sometimes ambiguous product positioning. Consider the early players in the social networking industry. Myspace, Friendster and Google's Orkut are notable competitors before the ascent of Facebook. All three websites started in California and targeted the US market initially. Over time, however, Myspace became the largest player in the US market, Friendster remained popular only in South East Asian countries, and Orkut has become one of the most visited websites in three culturally distinct countries:
Brazil, India and Estonia. While the sites were still competing for consumer time (as evidenced by the large number of consumers who join multiple networks), they acquired differentiated positions defined by distinct languages and cultures. There were strong evidences that this differentiation was not a consequence of the firms' deliberate strategic choices. For example, Friendster's CTO realized that half of its traffic was coming from the Phillipines when he accidentally spotted that the site's traffic peaked everyday past mid-night, San Francisco time. Differentiation also spontaneously emerged between Myspace and Facebook, the major contestants for US market leadership between [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In an ethnographic study, Boyd (2010) documents a so-called 'white flight' from MySpace to Facebook, and suggests that the two leading players in the US social networking market acquired differentiated market positions with racial connotations. Anecdotes in the on-line dating domain also suggest that consumers play important roles in shaping firms' market positioning. Match.com, one of the earliest entrant in this industry, had an ambitious positioning which catered to daters with a range of different objectives 2 . Its major competitors eHarmony, however, specifically targeted the serious, marriage-minded daters by marketing its sophisticated personality matching algorithm. eHarmony became so successful among serious daters that Match.com soon (unwillingly) acquired a reputation of being more popular among daters who only seek shortterm relationships. To compete with eHarmony, Match.com launched a premium service called Chemistry.com based on a different personality matching algorithm. Some consumers considered Chemistry.com's algorithm to be superior. But even to these consumers, eHarmony often remained more attractive due to its 'high quality pool' of serious daters 3 . The above examples illustrate some interesting cases where consumers play key roles in determining the firms' market positions, a phenomenon we later describe as 'spontaneous product differentiation'. Second, while network externalities are clearly significant in all Web 2.0 community markets, different Web 2.0 community categories exhibit widely varying levels of concentrations. In some markets, we observe the emergence of a dominant site (e.g., YouTube in the video-sharing industry and most recently Facebook in the social-networking industry) and a 'winner-take-all' market structure, which is the typical market outcome in traditional network industries. In other .0 community markets and shows that the index exhibits large variations across these domains.
Furthermore, rapid market growth seems to lead to lower market concentration in many Web 2.0 community markets. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom from the network literature that market growth is believed to foster higher market concentration.
Third, some consumers have strong tendencies to multi-home in competing communities while others are loyal to one site. A survey by Pew Research on North American adult social network users reveals that 51% of the respondents keep multiple profiles on different websites while 43% of respondents state that they only maintain one profile in a single community 5 . Moreover, it is believed that, as the market grows, consumers will be more likely to share their time between multiple specialized communities instead of single-homing in one large community with a general audience (Stafford 2009 , Bloomberg Businessweek 2009 ).
Finally, with respect to firm strategies, established Web 2.0 community sites increasingly 4 The index has been derived from the top ten sites in each category, with the following formula H = ∑ i=1...N s 2 i , where s i is the market share of firm i (Hirschman 1964) . Data source: Hitwise 2009. 5 See the report 'Social Networks Grow: Friending Mom and Dad' (Lenhart 2009 ).
take actions to 'limit connections' and encourage fragmentation within their communities. Armano (2009) observes that interaction within the successful social networks starts looking 'less social' as lists, groups, and 'friend control' functions proliferate. As a notable example, Facebook has recently introduced features that allow users to interact in smaller groups (New York Times 2010).
Similarly, the virtual world platform Second Life has made dramatic changes to the 'geographic' layout of its virtual world. Second Life started as a massive 'Mainland' where participants had a high chance to meet and interact. In recent years, its geography changed as an archipelago of walled-off islands were added to the virtual world.
Our paper seeks to shed some light on these stylized patterns and trends in the Web 2.0 community industry. Beyond replicating market outcomes, we are interested in identifying the determinants of firm profits and study competing firms' strategic choices. To do so, we develop a model of competing Web 2.0 community sites with the following main features:
• User-Generated Content: We assume that firms host user-generated content and don't produce content on their own. Each consumer (user) generates content consistent with her own preferences. Consumers derive utility from consuming the content generated by all the other consumers in the same community.
• Local Network Effects: The marginal utility from consuming a piece of content depends on the similarity between the consumer who contributes the content and the consumer who consumes the content. Consumers have stronger preferences for content generated by similar others 6 .
• Saturation from Content Consumption: Repeated consumption of similar content yields decreasing returns to consumers.
Besides these main features, our model assumes that consumers develop expectations about firms' customer bases and maximize utility by freely allocating a limited amount of time between competing Web 2.0 communities. On the supply side, we consider a duopoly of ex-ante identical Web 2.0 community firms who profit from advertising.
Our first set of results relate to the market outcomes in a competitive Web 2.0 community industry. The analysis reveals the existence of three qualitatively different types of equilibria.
When network effects are relatively global, there exists a winner-take-all equilibrium where all consumers join a single dominant firm's network. When network effects are relatively local, exante identical sites can obtain differentiated market positions that emerge spontaneously from usergenerated content. The sites attract different but overlapping consumer segments who then generate content consistent with their respective tastes. When network effects are sufficiently local, there exists an interesting equilibrium where one sites attracts two distinct consumer segments who do not value the content generated by each other. Despite its ambiguous positioning, this site coexists with its competitor who has a clear market position. Importantly, we show that the type of market outcome depends on the localness of network effects, not the magnitude of network effects. Firms are able to coexist under large network effects and winner-take-all outcome can emerge even when network effects are relatively small. In most equilibria, we also observe a segment of consumers who multi-home. Stronger saturation from content consumption enlarges this segment.
Our second set of results shed light on the properties of spontaneous differentiation and the determinants of firm profits. On the firm side, we show that spontaneous differentiation reduces firm competition similar to the case of classic horizontal differentiation. As expected, the degree of spontaneous differentiation is increasing in the localness of network effects. Thus, firm profits rise when members strongly favor the content generated by similar members. Interestingly, more multi-homing consumers result in fiercer competition between the communities and lead to lower profits. We show that this is a unique implication of user-generated content. It arises from the fact that as more users multi-home, the competing communities end up hosting overlapping content and face reduced differentiation. On the consumer side, we show that spontaneous differentiation may emerge even when consumers collectively prefer to join the same community. Thus, spontaneous differentiation may imply 'too much' consumer segregation from a social welfare perspective.
These results resonate to many of the stylized facts mentioned above.
In two extensions, we explore two market trends in the Web 2.0 community industry. First, we study the effect of market growth on market structure in a comparative static framework. The analysis reveals that market expansion in both breadth and density reduces the likelihood of the winner-take-all outcome and leads to lower market concentration. This stands in contrast with traditional network industries where a denser market usually implies higher concentration. Second, we consider the firms' community design problem where firms either enhance or reduce user connectivity in their communities. We find that in a heterogeneous market, competing firms may intentionally reduce connectivity, which leads to strictly lower but more local network effects. This strategy effectively maximizes spontaneous differentiation resulting from user-generated content.
However, when consumer heterogeneity is low, firms are more likely to enhance user connectivity within their communities which leads to minimal differentiation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature in marketing and economics. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents the analyses and discuss the equilibrium results. We present the extensions in Section 5. Section 6 discusses other aspects of the Web 2.0 community industry and concludes. To facilitate reading all proofs have been relegated to an appendix.
Literature Review
Our paper is related to four broad literature streams. First, it is related to the economics literature on product differentiation. Classic product differentiation models often assume a two-stage pro-cess where competing firms choose their product positioning in the first stage and then compete in prices (d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse 1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982) . In a user-generated content context, we study product differentiation in a model where "content positioning" depends on which users a site attracts. This setup is similar to Dmitri and Shachar (2010) where a brand's identity depends on the consumers who own it. We study competitive outcomes in this 'spontaneous' differentiation context and compare it with classic horizontal differentiation. We also study firms' incentives to influence spontaneous differentiation by managing consumer interactions 7 .
Second, our study is closely related to the vast literature on network externalities, in both economics (Katz and Shapiro 1985 , 1986 , Farrell and Klemperer 2005 and marketing (Xie and Sirbu 1995 , Ofek and Sarvary 2001 , Sun, Xie, and Cao 2004 , Chen and Xie 2007 , Tucker and Zhang 2010 . Most of these models assume a consumer utility function that increases linearly in network size. This simple assumption is sufficient to explain general industry outcomes such as the winner-take-all market structure. However, the Web 2.0 community industry is typically characterized by local, as opposed to global network effects. Local network effects have been studied by a few recent papers in economics (Fjeldstad, Moen, and Riis 2009, Banerji and Dutta 2009) . Our model is similar to these papers but, in line with the Web 2.0 community context, has other features such as saturation from repeated content consumption. More importantly, we apply a more general solution concept to the game. To our knowledge, ours is the first model with local network effects that yields the classic global network effect model and winner-take-all outcome as a special case. Third, to model advertising competition between communities, we adopt the standard 'advertising disutility' paradigm (Dukes and Gal-Or 2003 , Dukes 2004 , Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac 2004 , Anderson and Coate 2005 , Anderson and Gans 2010 . This framework assumes that consumers consider advertising as nuisance. The tendency of ad avoidance has found much empirical support (see Wilbur (2008) for a recent example).
Finally, we assume consumer multi-homing and as a result, the paper is also related to papers on multiple buying, wherein consumers purchase multiple products from competing firms (Caillaud and Jullien 2003 , Doganoglu and Wright 2006 , Guo 2006 , Xiang and Sarvary 2007 .
In particular, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Doganoglu and Wright (2006) both study the impact of multi-homing behavior on platform competition under network effects. Both papers consider network products sold via fixed prices. Multi-homing implies paying for both products and product utilities are also additive. Our model introduces features specific to the Web 2.0 community context. We assume that consumers allocate a fixed amount of time between the communities.
Both advertising disutility and consumption utility are proportional to the amount of time spent in a site, and repeated content consumption yields decreasing return. Importantly to our context, this aspect of the demand also affects our supply function: the amount of content a user generates for the community depends on how much time she allocates to the site.
The Model
We consider a simple Web 2.0 community market with two ex-ante identical community sites indexed i = 1, 2 competing for a heterogeneous set of consumers. Sites earn profits from advertising 8 . A site's subscribers derive utility from consuming the content generated by other members in the same community and choose to allocate their limited amount of time between the competing sites (multi-homing). Site's content depends on the type of consumers they attract (user-generated content) and the amount of time these consumers spend at the sites. Consumers prefer content generated by similar users (local network effect) and derive disutility from advertising.
8 There are three major revenue models for Web 2.0 community websites: advertising (as in YouTube), membership fees (as in the case of dating websites) and taxing the virtual economy (as in the case of Second Life). In an appendix available from the authors, we show that all three revenue models can be modeled in a mathematically equivalent way and we use the term advertising throughout the paper to facilitate reading.
The game consists of the following stages. First, all parties (both consumers and firms) form expectations about which users will join which website and how much time they will spend on the sites. Firms set advertising levels according to their expectations about the type and amount of content they will host. Then consumers make time allocation decisions based on the advertising levels and the expected type and amount of content in each community. We seek the Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium where the expected consumer time allocation pattern coincides with the realized time allocation pattern Shapiro 1985, Farrell and Klemperer 2005) . Below, we elaborate on these features in greater details.
Consumers
Consumers are heterogeneous and we assume that their types are uniformly distributed on a linear city C = [0, 1]. Each user is simultaneously 'content consumer' and 'content contributor' and each consumer's preference is correlated with the content generated by her. Specifically, a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] generates a piece of content at the same location in each unit of her time.
We assume that consumers have access to the content generated by the other consumers in the same community 9 . Thus, the total content consumption benefit consumer x derives from joining community i, v i x is: personal experiences and reflect their preferences.
As a result, δ (x, y) depends on the similarity between the content contributor y and the content consumer x. In other words, there are local network effects, where consumers benefit more from the presence of 'similar' others in the same community. Specifically, we assume δ (x, y) is decreasing as x and y become more distant 10 :
The above formulation allows for the possibilities of negative marginal content utility. For example, it is a well documented phenomenon that some Second Life participants consider each other annoying. We complete the consumers' utility function by incorporating advertising disutility a i that is proportional to advertising intensity (Dukes and Gal-Or 2003) and a constant term c 11 .
The total utility a consumer derives from site i is therefore:
10 It is useful to examine the network benefit function v i x under the special case of global network effects. When δ (x, y) = α, the formulation reduces to the classic network externality function proposed by Shapiro (1985, 1986) :
, where x e is the expected number of consumers joining network i. As such, a consumer's utility only depends on the size of the community. 11 We do not model the fact that under certain cases, consumers may actually derive positive utility from seeing a well-designed ad. The non-content benefit c that a consumer gets from joining a community may capture, for example, the intrinsic motivation from content contribution (e.g., making a YouTube video or writing a blog article may be fun on its own right); See Bénabou and Tirole (2006) for a discussion. This is also a standard technical assumption in the product differentiation literature that guarantees market coverage.
When consumers single-home, consumer x will join network i if
Next, we allow multi-homing where consumers allocate their time between the competing communities. For simplicity we assume that each consumer disposes only two units of time. Each consumer x chooses T i (x) based on her expectation of all the other consumers' time allocation
. Multi-homing takes place when a consumer allocates 1 unit of her time in each community.
We assume that y generates k units of content in community i if y allocates k units of her time in community i. As such, consumer x may repeatedly consume the content generated by y. Given T e 1 (y), the number of times that consumer x consumes y's content is t xy (T 1 (x), T e 1 (y)) =
, where t xy ∈ {0, 2, 4}. For example, when T 1 (x) = T 2 (x) = 1 and T e 1 (y) = T e 2 (y) = 1, both x and y multi-home, and x consumes 2 of y's content in two different communities. When
T e 2 (y) = 0, x allocates one unit of her time to community 1 while y generates two units of content in community 1. Thus, x consumes 2 of y's content in the same community. When T 1 (x) = 2, T e 1 (y) = 2, both x and y singe-home in community 1, and x consumes 4 of y's content.
We consider a network utility function δ (x, y,t xy ) concave in t xy , which implies 'saturation' from repeated consumption of the same type of content. Formally,
. Consumer x chooses T 1 (x) to maximize:
where
where 0 < γ < 1. Note that the time allocation decision of consumer x is a function of T e 1 (y) and a 1 , a 2 , which we denote as T r 1 (x, T e 1 , a 1 , a 2 ). Put differently, a consumer's time allocation decision depends on her expectation about all other consumers' time allocation decisions and the firms' advertising levels. As will be defined in Section 3.3, the equilibrium time allocation involves selffulfilling expectation and is denoted as T * 1 (x).
Firms
We consider two competing sites setting their advertising intensities a i > 0. Ad intensity can be thought of as the number of ads displayed on each page. The site's profit is proportional to the number of ads multiplied by the price for each ad:
p(·) is the mapping from the consumer impressions a website receives to an advertiser's willingness to pay for an ad slot on this website. We assume that advertisers have higher willingness to pay for an ad slot with more consumer impressions. Specifically,
where x∈C T r i (x, T e 1 , a 1 , a 2 )dx is the total amount of consumer time spent in community i and s is the prevailing cost per impression (normalized to 1 2 ).
Recall that we assume that displaying more ads in general leads to less enjoyable consumer experience since consumers find ads a nuisance. When consumers spend less time on a community, the advertising price on this website will also drop. The profit function captures this tradeoff between ad intensity and ad price and is a standard formulation from the literature (Dukes and Gal-Or 2003 , Gabszewicz et al. 2004 , Anderson and Gans 2010 .
Equilibrium Concept
We generalize the solution concept of Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium (FEE) from the network effect literature (see e.g., Katz and Shapiro) . In its classic form, a Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium consists of a network size that is a fixed point of the mapping from expected network size to realized network size x r = Γ(x e ) 12 . The FEE solution concept has a straightforward extension in our setup.
We consider the functional Γ that maps the expected time allocation function T e 1 to the realized time allocation pattern T r 1 when firms set advertising levels taking T e 1 as given. The consumer time allocation pattern in a Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium satisfies T * 1 = Γ(T * 1 ). Equivalently, the equilibrium consists of a time allocation function T * 1 and advertising levels a * 1 and a * 2 such that:
The mapping Γ is defined as
We further restrict our interests to stable FEEs. The precise definition of stability is given in the appendix. While conceptually straightforward, extending expectation from a real number to a function leads to considerable complexity in solving the fixed-point problem of Γ, which we address in the Appendix.
12 Let x e denote the expected network size of firm 1. Firm 2's network size is therefore 1 − x e . The mapping Γ is derived as follows. Consumers make purchase decisions based on x e and prices, and the demand function is x r (x e , p 1 , p 2 ). Firms set prices to maximize profits, leading to p
Analysis
We first present equilibrium results from the basic model. As in the network externality literature, there are many possible equilibria and uniqueness can rarely be obtained. Our analysis focuses on existence results to highlight interesting outcomes that may relate to the stylized facts discussed in the introduction. We focus on three aspects of market outcomes: market shares, consumer multi-homing behavior and site profits. To set a benchmark, we start by showing that when the network effects are relatively global, the classic winner-take-all outcome emerges where only one firm makes positive profit. 
) and its competitor's profit is 0.
The winner-take-all outcome is a typical market structure in many traditional industries characterized by global network effects (see Farrell and Klemperer for empirical evidences). Our analysis further suggests that this winner-take-all outcome persists even when the network effects are 'slightly local'. Furthermore, Proposition 1 also shows that decreasing returns from content consumption (small γ) reduce the likelihood of winner-take-all outcome.
Next, we explore a more interesting outcome, namely the 'spontaneous differentiation' equilibrium where ex-ante identical sites acquire differentiated market positions that the firms cannot control.
Proposition 2. When
, there exist two stable 'spontaneous differentiation' equilibria where
Firm profits are
.
Proposition 2 describes a type of content differentiation where website i hosts more content generated by users at x < 1 2 and website −i hosts more content generated by users at x > 1 2 . Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium multi-homing pattern. The consumers on the two extremes single-home in their preferred communities while the consumers in the middle multi-home in order to consume both types of content. We name this equilibrium outcome 'spontaneous differentiation' to reflect the fact that the firms are ex-ante identical and the differentiation is created completely with usergenerated content. The spontaneous differentiation equilibrium has the following features:
• Similar to the classic horizontal differentiation, spontaneous differentiation reduces competition and leads to higher profits. Both firms earn non-zero profits even if they are ex-ante identical.
• It is sometimes impossible to differentiate with user-generated content at all. The spontaneous differentiation equilibrium only exists when network effects are sufficiently local.
Comparing the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2, it can be seen that the winner-take-all outcome and the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium represent mutually exclusive market outcomes.
• Spontaneous differentiation equilibria always exist in pairs. Firms don't choose their market positions (e.g., left vs right) and market positions emerge as a result of consumer coordination. Put differently, firms may obtain 'unanticipated' market positions.
Clearly, spontaneous differentiation is a consequence of user-generated content as well as local network effects. But does competition also play a role in the creation of spontaneous differentiation? We find that site competition is often a necessary condition for spontaneous differentiation to be sustained. To illustrate this point, consider a model where the firms do not interact in a competitive way (e.g., advertising levels are fixed at zero). Proposition 3 states the existence condition for spontaneous differentiation when firms don't compete. 
where t xy is defined by the equilibrium time allocation pattern:
Proposition 3 states that when firms do not compete, spontaneous differentiation equilibrium exists only when two groups of consumers 'dislike' each other. Specifically, the time allocation function T * i defines two groups of single-homing consumers who do not consume the content generated by each other ((x, y)|t xy = 0}). For spontaneous differentiation equilibrium to be stable, it is a necessary condition that these consumers collectively prefer to stay in different communities rather than join the same community. Conversely, if the single-homing consumers derive higher welfare from joining the same community, the spontaneous differentiation outcome is non-stable.
Comparing the conditions in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, it is clear that the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium is more likely to exist when sites compete with each other in advertising.
When firms compete, spontaneous differentiation equilibrium may exist even when consumers collectively prefer joining the same community. This is evident from the fact that differentiation can be sustained even when the marginal network externality is always strictly positive (α −β > 0), such that no two consumers 'dislike' each other. In summary, spontaneous differentiation is a result of competitive site interaction and may lead to too much 'consumer segregation' that implies lower social welfare.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 resonates with anecdotal evidence. service across the world. It surpassed Friendster as the most popular social networking site in the Phillipines and Orkut as the most popular site in India. According to Kirkpatrick (2011) , there are three reasons that underly the success of Facebook: first, the site has a simple and clean design, which enhanced user experience. Second, the site's collaborative translation tool greatly facilitated its adoption into local languages. Third, the social networking industry has seen a paradigm shift since 2007. In May 2007, Facebook introduced its app platform which allowed third party developers to develop their own applications and keep 100% of the revenues. Within six months, 250,000 developers signed up. Myspace quickly followed suit later in the same year. Since Facebook's users were considered the most valuable by advertisers, more apps were developed for Facebook.
These apps were easily translated into other languages with the same collaborative translation tool, and this gave Facebook an edge over its competitors. In our terminology, when social networking users' primary activity was browsing the photos and posts by their friends, the network effects are local in scope. Photos posted by one consumer are only of interests to her friends. When third party apps entered the picture, the network effects become much more global, since apps developed for one group of consumers are most likely also of interests to another group of consumers.
This eventually leads to a winner-take-all outcome.
Our finding about consumer multi-homing is also consistent with empirical observations.
We find that multi-homing consumers are those who locate in the middle of the linear city. When network externalities are sufficiently local, more complicated differentiation structures can be sustained. Proposition 4 states the existence of a type of equilibrium where one site attracts two distinct groups of users:
2(3−γ) , there exist two stable equilibria where
The equilibrium time allocation patterns are illustrated on Figure 2 . Consumers located at the two 'ends' of the linear city prefer the content hosted in site i while the consumers residing in the 'middle' prefer the content hosted in site −i. In equilibrium, the firm with the divided clientele sets a lower advertising level to retain its consumers. Interestingly, although the mass centers of the two firms' content overlap (at x = 1 2 ), the sites are differentiated because of the highly localized content preferences. Furthermore, firm i attracts two distinct segments of consumers who do not enjoy the presence of each other. More specifically, the marginal network effects δ (x, y) between these two segments of consumers are small and can be negative.
This outcome is reminiscent of Orkut's simultaneous success in three culturally distinct countries: Brazil, India and Estonia. Orkut became one of the most visited websites in Brazil and India until 2010. As of April 2010, 48% of Orkut's traffic comes from Barzil while 39% of its traffic is from India. At the same time, it has also become the most used social network platform in 17 We provide a special case to better illustrate the intuition: when γ = 1, the equilibrium becomes:
Estonia 18 . Although these three user groups are simultaneously present in the Orkut community, they form subcommunities that seldomly interact with each other. Figure 2 can be considered an illustration of the Orkut case where Myspace (later Facebook) dominates the US market while Orkut is popular among Barzilians and Indians (i.e., two disjoint segments of consumers). In addition, multicultural consumers -such as Brazilians and Indians living in the US -are found to be the most likely multi-homers who join both Orkut and Facebook/Myspace.
Single-homing consumers in community i
Single-homing consumers in community i
Multi-homing consumers

Single-homing consumers in community -i To summarize, the model provides a variety of qualitatively different market outcomes and may explain some of the observed patterns in the evolution of Web 2.0 communities. Importantly, the existence of different types of equilibria depends on the localness ( β α ), not the magnitude (δ (x, y)), of network effects. For example, the case α = 3, β = 3 represents large network externalities. The average marginal network effect is δ (x, y) = 2. On the other hand, α = 1, β = 0 represent small average marginal network effects with δ (x, y) = 1. Spontaneous differentiation can be sustained in the former case but winner-take-all outcome emerges in the latter.
Being a unique feature of the Web 2.0 community market, what is the profit implication of spontaneous differentiation? Since users generate content, how do consumer behavior parameters 18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orkut impact firm profits? Next, we present a number of comparative static results to examine how the localness of network externalities (measured by β when α is fixed) and saturation from repeated content consumption (measured by γ) impact consumer behavior and firm profits. We focus on the case described in Proposition 2 where spontaneous differentiation emerges between the competing firms. Corollary 1 examines consumer behavior.
Corollary 1 (Consumer Behavior). In the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium, more consumers multi-home when γ and β are small. Put differently, multi-homing is more likely when network effects are more global and saturation from repeated content consumption is strong.
As expected, consumers are more likely to multi-home when saturation from repeated content consumption is strong (γ is small). Furthermore, global network effects lead to more consumers multi-homing. Global network effects imply that consumers have broader interests. Therefore, they multi-home in order to reach out to different types of content. Taken together with the findings from Proposition 1, we observe that when network effects become more global, the number of multi-homing consumers first increases -then decreases as the winner-take-all outcome emerges, in which case all consumers single-home in the same community.
Corollary 2 (Firm Profits). In the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium, firm profits are increas-
ing in β and γ: i.e., firm profits are higher when network effects are more local and saturation in content consumption is weaker.
In the classic horizontal differentiation literature, the degree of product differentiation is usually measured by a 'transportation cost' parameter t a la Hotelling. Higher transportation cost implies higher profits. In the Web 2.0 community setup, we observe that the localness of network effect β is the counterpart of the transport cost parameter in the classic scenario. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, differentiation between Web 2.0 community websites stems from the different locations of their content generating users. The localness of network effects makes this differentiation more pronounced. Firm profits rise as network effects become more local. This stands in sharp contrast with the earlier findings in the literature. When horizontal differentiation depends on firms' choices of market positioning, multi-buying usually diminishes the strategic incentives of price cutting since there is less need to compete for consumers who purchase both products (Guo 2006 , Xiang and Sarvary 2007 , Doganoglu and Wright 2006 . Consequently, in the classic model, more multi-homing consumers would likely lead to higher firm profits. When content is user-generated, we observe that consumer multi-homing behavior endogenously changes the degree of spontaneous differentiation. When a user participates in competing websites, the content she contributes is also likely to appear on both websites. Thus, multi-homing behavior leads to greater overlap of content and therefore less product differentiation. It is worth pointing out that saturation from repeated content consumption is just one of the many possible causes to consumer multi-homing behavior. However, we believe that the above link between multi-homing and the degree of product differentiation is a fundamental property of user-generated content. The finding in Corollary 2 is likely to generalize to situations where consumer multi-homing is caused by other factors.
Extensions
In this section, we explore two extensions to the basic model. First, we analyze the effect of market growth both in terms of depth and breadth. Second, we study the firms' incentives to influence the localness of network externalities.
Market Growth
The growth of the Web 2.0 community market is significant not just in terms of size (i.e., the number of new consumers) but as importantly, in terms of breadth (i.e., the heterogeneity of con-sumers). For example, while at the outset only young people used social networks, today all age groups start embracing social network services. To model market growth, we introduce 'market density' and 'market heterogeneity' as additional parameters. We analyze the impacts of market growth in a comparative static framework. Formally, we assume that a mass ρ of consumers are uniformly distributed on a linear city [0, H] , where H measures the heterogeneity of the consumers.
Proposition 5 establishes the comparative static result about the impact of ρ and H on the market structure.
Proposition 5. Under larger H, the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium is more likely to exist
and the winner-take-all equilibrium is less likely to exist. ρ has no impact on equilibrium market structure.
Consistent with the findings from the classic network externality literature, market expansion in heterogeneity leads to less concentrated market structure where competing firms co-exist.
The intuition is that the degree of horizontal product differentiation grows with market heterogeneity. Market tipping (e.g., the winner-take-all outcome) is less likely to take place when product differentiation is large.
More surprisingly, we find that growth in market size (ρ) has no impact on the likelihood of different market outcomes. This result stands in contrast with the conventional wisdom from the network effect literature. The classic network effect model predicts that when the breadth of the market is fixed, increase in market density will increase the likelihood of the winner-takeall outcome. This is because market density determines the magnitudes of network effects, and larger network effects lead to market tipping when differentiation is exogenously given. However, when differentiation spontaneously emerges from user-generated content, product differentiation increases when the market is denser. The growth in product differentiation counterbalances the growth in network effects and does not change the equilibrium market structure.
Overall, Proposition 5 reveals that when the market grows in both size and heterogeneity, the Web 2.0 community industry tends to become more fragmented with multiple firms coexisting.
This provides a demand-side explanation to industry observations on market fragmentation. Social media practitioners observe that social networks will 'become smaller' (Stafford 2009) when there is market entry. Our analysis provides a demand-side explanation to the fragmentation phenomenon by arguing that when user-generated content is responsible for the differentiation between firms, market growth leads to more differentiation, which in turn prevents the winnertake-all outcome from taking place.
Designing Internet Communities: Connectivity vs Fragmentation
Since spontaneous differentiation derives from user-generated content, can firms take actions to influence the degree of differentiation? In this section, we address this 'community design' problem. We argue that firms can endogenously influence α and β by either enhancing or dampening connectivity within their communities. Consider the following example:
• In the Second Life meta-verse, social interaction can be managed through the geographical layout of the virtual world. An 'archipelago' layout makes the users reside in isolated, more exclusive communities. From consumer x's perspective, the addition of a dissimilar consumer y into the community has little marginal benefit, since the probability that x will encounter y is very low. This corresponds to a higher β -δ (x, y) quickly diminishes as |x − y| becomes large. On the other hand, a 'Pangaea' layout, where every user can potentially meet every other, offers the users maximal opportunities to encounter dissimilar others. The enhanced connectivity leads to a lower β such that the consumer derives some marginal utility as a dissimilar other joins the community.
• Video-sharing websites such as YouTube can endogenously influence α and β by choosing the level of content cross-linking. On YouTube, for example, a 'suggestion' list of related videos is displayed to viewers of a certain video. Increasing cross-linking is likely to decrease β .
• Social networking websites can use design features such as 'groups' and 'lists' to reduce user interaction. On the two extremes, the community can allow highly customized 'gated Clearly, many of the above actions have simultaneous impacts on α and β . When consumers interact in exclusive groups, both α and β are likely to be increased, leading to enhanced network effects when |x − y| is small and diminished network effects when |x − y| is large. Put differently, the connectivity-fragmentation decision has both a direct effect (by influencing the level of network effects in each community) and a strategic effect (by influencing the degree of spontaneous differentiation between the communities). To isolate the strategic effect as best as we can, we consider a special case where firm decisions only impact β . Specifically, we consider a two stage game where firms choose between two alternative 'designs' in the first stage: (α, β ) or (α, β ), where β < β . To keep the model tractable, we assume γ = 1 and focus on the spontaneous differentiation equilibrium in Proposition 2. We keep parameters ρ and H introduced in the previous section. Proposition 6 states the firms' equilibrium community design strategies. Proposition 6 outlines the equilibrium conditions under which firms prefer to encourage fragmentation versus connectivity in their communities. Contrary to conventional wisdom that enhancing network externalities in a network industry is beneficial for the firms, Web 2.0 community firms have an incentive to reduce the connectivity in their communities. Moreover, firms are more likely to reduce connectivity if such reduction leads to lower network effects (higher β ). The intuition underlying this result resembles the idea of maximal product differentiation. By unilaterally making the network externalities more local, a firm faces smaller demand (a negative direct effect). On the other hand, more local network externalities reduce the firms' incentives to compete for consumers (a positive strategic effect). When the strategic effect dominates, firms will deliberately decrease connectivity in their community. Put differently, firms have incentives to maximize the ex-post spontaneous differentiation.
In contrast to the classic product differentiation literature, however, there exists a parameter region where both firms encourage connectivity in their respective communities, which leads to minimal spontaneous differentiation. In a model of classic horizontal differentiation, the strategic effect of higher differentiation always exceeds the direct effect. Under spontaneous differentiation, however, the direct effect of higher connectivity (lower β ) is magnified by the network externalities. A larger demand translates into higher network effects, which leads to even higher demand.
As Proposition 6 states, there exist a parameter region where the direct effect of decreasing β exceeds the strategic effect and both firms choose high connectivity. This case represents a prisoner's dilemma situation where firm profits would be higher if both firms chose more local network effects, but they cannot coordinate on such an outcome.
Finally and intuitively, as the market expands in heterogeneity (H), the firms are more likely to pursue the fragmentation strategy. Again, we find that market size ρ does not have an effect on firm decisions.
The above results provide a strategic explanation to some stylized facts in the industry. As discussed in the introduction, we observe that various successful Web 2.0 community sites have recently implemented measures to enhance local interaction at the cost of broader connectivity. Examples include the recent move by Facebook which allows users to interact in smaller groups (New York Times 2010) and Second Life's shifting focus into the archipelago design. These changes are believed to be motivated by the need to minimize negative network effects and boost interactivity within exclusive spaces. Beyond this obvious reason, our analysis suggest that firms may encourage fragmentation within their own communities also to reduce competition. Notably, firms have incentives to make consumers interact in smaller groups even if this approach strictly decreases the marginal network effects.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the competition between Web 2.0 community websites. We model three unique aspects of the Web 2.0 community industry, namely (i) user-generated content, (ii) local network externalities and (iii) consumer multi-homing. We find that when content is strictly usergenerated, identical firms may spontaneously acquire differentiated market positions by attracting different groups of content contributors. We study the properties of this spontaneous differentiation and find that more local network effects increase the degree of differentiation while multi-homing coincides with reduced differentiation. As extensions, we analyze the role of market expansion and study firms' community design problem, where the firms may either encourage 'fragmentation' or enhance 'connectivity'. The analysis reveals that as the market grows, the Web 2.0 community market tends to become less concentrated and firms are more likely to design fragmented communities. Our results are consistent with a number of stylized facts observed in the Web 2.0 community industry.
The Web 2.0 community industry is a fast developing industry with many innovations in both the technology and business domains. The power of mass interaction and user generated content is being leveraged into more and more business and public policy contexts, such as distance Finally, as a theoretical note, we believe that the development of user-generated content is a phenomenon that is of interest for both marketing and economics. There is broad agreement that user-generated content represents a novel situation not fully addressed by the traditional economics literature. Theoretically, our analysis suggest a close link between the notion of user-generated content and network effects. The classic model of network externalities can be considered a model of user-generated content where the quality of the product (network) depends on the number of contributing users. Ex-ante identical firms can obtain ex-post different quality levels as a result of consumer coordination. When network effects are localized, both vertical (quality) and horizontal differentiation can occur as a result of user coordination. Further developing this argument is an interesting avenue for theoretical research.
tion of the stability conditions in the classic network externalities literature, which are shown to be necessary to rule out implausible outcomes 19 .
B Proofs for Propositions
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: A stable FEE meets three necessary conditions:
In words, the advertising levels are best responses to each other given the market expectation, and the market expectation is self-fulling. In addition, the market expectation is stable as defined in Definition 2. We first show that the equilibrium stated in Proposition 1 ∀x, T * 1 (x) = 2,
) and a * 2 = 0 satisfy these conditions iff α > 3β 2 and γ > 1 2 . Next we verify that the equilibrium is always stable.
Step 1: We first provide conditions such that given market expectation ∀x, T * 1 (x) = 2, advertising levels a * 1 = γ(α − 
2 )), consumer x will prefer spending both units of her time in community 1. Otherwise, the consumer will allocate one unit of time in each community. The marginal consumer can be determined by solving the x that is indifferent between single-homing in community 1 and multi-homing. Specifically, when
) will single-home in community 1 while the other consumers multi-home. When γ(α −
, consumers on the two ends of the linear city start to single-home in community 2. Given T * 1 (x) = 2 and a * 2 = 0, site 1's profit function in the range a 1 ∈ (0, α − β 2 ) is:
The profit function is increasing when
2 ) to be the optimal advertising level, it is required that:
The first condition implies that when a 1 = γ(α − β 2 ), site 1 has no incentives to marginally rise advertising such that the consumers located at 0 and 1 start to multi-home. The second condition implies that the site doesn't choose an advertising level such that all consumers multi-home.
2β , these conditions are satisfied i f f α > Finally, observe that when a 1 > α − β 2 , consumers on the two ends of the linear city start to single-home in site 2. Clearly,
2 ), we show that site 2's best response is a * 2 = 0. Given site 1's advertising level, site 2 cannot gain positive demand regardless of its advertising level. Thus, any positive advertising level is weakly dominated.
Step 2: We next prove that given the advertising levels, T * 1 (x) = 2 is self-fulfilling. It can be easily seen that given a * 1 = γ(α − β 2 ) and a * 2 = 0, all consumers prefer to single-home in community 1.
Step 3: We next prove that this equilibrium is always stable. Consider an ε-perturbation in market expectation as described in Definition 2:
The consumers' time allocation can be characterized as follows: consumer x multi-homes
2 )) and single-homes in site 1 otherwise. The demand and profits functions can be derived accordingly. Importantly, at any advertising level, 
The left-hand-sides of inequalities in condition (13) (13) are also satisfied when ε is sufficiently small. Intuitively, when ε is sufficiently small, site 1 can win the entire market by a small decrease in advertising level a * 1 and will indeed do so. In other words, Γ(T (x)) = Γ(T * (x)) for sufficiently small ε. This is true for any parameter values α > and T * 1 (x) as described in Proposition 2. We first verify that for any parameters, the advertising levels are best responses to each other and that the time allocation pattern is self-fulfilling. Then we show that the equilibrium is also stable iff α < 5β +7β γ 8γ−5γ 2 +5
Step 1: The market expectation T * 1 (x) defines the marginal consumers x * 1 = 2(β −α+αγ) β (γ+3) such that consumers y < x * 1 and y > 1 − x * 1 are expected to be the single-homers. We first derive firm profit functions. From Equation (4) and (5), we know that when consumer y's content is expected to appear in both communities, consumer x derives marginal utility δ (x, y) from y's content regardless of her time allocation decision (t xy = 2). Thus, only the unique content (i.e., content that appears in only one community) matters for consumer x's decision of multi-homing vs single-homing. From
Equation 4, we know consumer x's decision can be characterized by the following rule:
For a * 1 = a * 2 to be best responses to each other, it is necessary for them to be local best response to each other. When a 1 and a 2 are not too different, consumers x < 1 2 prefer single-homing in community 1 to single-homing in community 2. Thus, x < 1 2 's time allocation decision reduces to choosing between single-homing in community 1 and multi-homing. Similarly, consumers x > 1 2 choose between single-homing in community 2 and multi-homing. Thus, the demand schedule can be characterized by:
be fully described by x 1 and x 2 . The exact expressions for x 1 (x * 1 , a 1 , a 2 ) and x 2 (x * 1 , a 1 , a 2 ) are complicated, but the derivatives
are easy to obtain from implicit function theorems. For example,
Firm profits are:
The best responses are characterized by the first order conditions:
The exact expressions of
can be obtained by plugging in
at x 1 = x * 1 and x 2 = 1−x * 1 . We verify that the advertising levels a * 1 = a * 2 = γβ +β +αγ 2 −α 2(γ+3) satisfy the first order conditions. It is easy to see that the sites do not have incentives to deviate their advertising levels far from a * 1 = a * 2 to qualitatively change the demand schedule, such that no consumer will single-home in community 1 or 2. Thus, the advertising levels are also global best response to each other.
Step 2: It is easy to verify that the market expectation is self fulfilling, by observing that the advertising levels and market expectation satisfy the following system of equations:
Step 3: Finally we provide conditions under which the equilibrium is also stable according to Definitions 1 and 2. Note that the marginal consumers in this case consist of the consumers located at x * 1 and 1 − x * 1 . Any marginal perturbation of T 1 (x) of T * 1 (x) can be described by x 1 and
Thus the Γ mapping is reduced to a function
The stability condition can be inferred from the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix:
The partial derivatives are obtained by the total derivative formula. In words, when market expectation changes, the realized time allocation pattern changes for two reasons. First, when advertising levels are fixed, consumers change their time allocation behavior due to the change in their valuation of the sites' content. Second, sites change their advertising level, which leads to further change in consumer time allocation decision. For example,
where derivatives
describe how the equilibrium advertising levels change with x 1 .
All the derivatives are evaluated at
and a * 1 = a * 2 = γβ +β +αγ 2 −α 2(γ+3)
are evaluated as before based on the implicit function theorem and the implicit definition of x 1 (x 1 , a 1 , a 2 ) .
are obtained based on the implicit function theorem from the first order conditions (17).
The stability condition is met when both eigenvalues σ are bounded by 1 in absolute values.
This leads to the condition α < 5β +7β γ 8γ−5γ 2 +5
. Finally, when α > β 4 , the consumers always derive positive network utility from the community they join.
2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
When a 1 = a 2 ≡ 0, the fulfilled expectation equilibrium must satisfy ∀x, T * 1 (x) = T r 1 (x, T * 1 , 0, 0). Clearly, the same equilibrium time allocation pattern described in Proposition 2 is self-fulfilling:
This is due to the fact that when a 1 = a 2 , the time allocation decision of a consumer depends only on her expectation of other consumers' time allocation pattern. Thus T * 1 (x) is self-fulling under a 1 = a 2 = 0 if and only if it is self-fulfilling under a * 1 = a * 2 = γβ +β +αγ 2 −α 2(γ+3)
The stability of the equilibrium can be determined by examining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, as in the proof for Proposition 2. Without competitive interaction, we have
. This leads to the conditions given in Proposition 3.
Finally, the stability conditions is equivalent to γ(α − β x * 1 ) + α − β (1 − x * 1 ) < 0 where
, it is a necessary condition that α −β (1 −x * 1 ) < 0.
Note that (x,y)∈{(x,y)|t xy =0}
δ (x, y)dydx = (1 − x * 1 )(α − β (1 − x * 1 )).
Thus, a necessary condition for the spontaneous differentiation outcome to be stable is Consider any symmetric market expectation in which the consumers located in the middle of the linear city will single-home in site 1 and the consumers located at the two ends of the linear city will single-home in site 2. Observe that given this market expectation and any advertising levels, the consumer behavior is monotonic: those located at the ends of the linear city are strictly more likely to single-home in community 2 while those located closer to x = 1 2 are strictly more likely to single-home in community 1. We derive demand schedules as before. We show that the advertising levels are locally best response to each other by verifying that they simultaneously solve the two first order conditions. We provide the analytical expressions for A(α, β , γ) , B(α, β , γ) and λ (γ). A and B are described by the following general expressions:
A(α, β , γ) = λ 1 (γ)α+λ 2 (γ)β +λ 3 (γ) √ λ 4 (γ)α 2 +λ 5 (γ)β 2 +λ 6 (γ)αβ λ 7 (γ)β B(α, β , γ) = λ 8 (γ)α+λ 9 (γ)β +λ 10 (γ) √ λ 4 (γ)α 2 +λ 5 (γ)β 2 +λ 6 (γ)αβ λ 7 (γ)β (21) where λ 1 − λ 10 are defined as: λ 1 (γ) = γ 5 + 3γ 4 + γ 3 − 21γ 2 + 18γ + 6 λ 2 (γ) = 6γ 2 − 3γ 4 − 3/2γ 3 − 1/2γ 5 − 10γ − 3 λ 3 (γ) = 3/2γ − 1 + 1/2γ 2 λ 4 (γ) = 4γ 6 − 8γ 5 + 40γ 4 − 112γ 3 + 116γ 2 + 24γ λ 5 (γ) = γ 6 + 6γ 5 + γ 4 − 14γ 3 + 32γ 2 + 6γ λ 6 (γ) = −γ 6 − 16γ 5 + 12γ 4 − 96γ 3 + 120γ 2 + 24γ λ 7 (γ) = γ 5 + 6γ 4 − 7γ 3 − 6γ 2 + 28γ + 6 λ 8 (γ) = 2γ 5 + 4γ 4 − 18γ 3 + 38γ 2 − 8γ − 2 λ 9 (γ) = 2γ 4 + 4γ 3 − 14γ 2 + 10γ + 2 λ 10 (γ) = −2γ + 3 + γ −1
The condition α > β 2 is required such that in equilibrium, all consumers derive positive network utility from the communities they join. 
The equilibrium of the game can be found in the exact same way as in the proof of Proposition 1 and 2. The existence condition for the winner-take-all equilibrium is: α > 
From the advertising levels, we obtain the realized consumer time allocation patterns as functions of the market expectation. From the condition that market expectation is self-fulfilling, we obtain the equilibrium consumer time allocation pattern:
Recall that we fix γ = 1 and therefore consumers do not multi-home in this setup. x * 1 is the fulfilled network size of the site who chooses β . Consumers from [0, x * 1 ] will join site 1 and consumers from [x * addition, the threshold is decreasing in H. Due to symmetry, we show that the firms pursue the connectivity strategy when F(β ) > 0. This is satisfied when β is slightly smaller than β . 
